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GROUPS, WORK AND INTERDEPENDENCE 
IN THE UK CIVIL SERVICE 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In terms of its implications for work and production, studies of teamworking have generally 
relied on concepts of autonomy and flexibility.  An in-depth, qualitative case study of the UK 
Inland Revenue reveals a form of teamworking in which both autonomy and flexibility play 
little part.  It is argued that teamworking in this case is best conceptualised by giving greater 
weight to interdependence.  In particular, teamworking in the Inland Revenue works through 
the outcome interdependence engendered by the emphasis on group or team work targets.  
This form of teamworking is given the name ‘target-based teamworking’.  Certain aspects of 
the nature of production appear to encourage this form of teamworking.  More generally, the 
case promotes interdependence as a means of understanding teamworking, and suggests that 
the key to this understanding is an analysis of the relationship between interdependence and 
autonomy. 
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TARGET-BASED TEAMWORKING: 
GROUPS, WORK AND INTERDEPENDENCE 
IN THE UK CIVIL SERVICE 
 
 
Introduction: Teamworking, Autonomy and Interdependence 
 
Two Puzzles 
We begin this paper with two puzzles: one conceptual, the other empirical.  The first puzzle 
concerns the basic question of how we define teamworking in its current manifestation.  In 
particular, how do we overcome what Benders & Van Hootegem (1999: 618) call ‘the issue 
of autonomy’?  How, in other words, do we reconcile a definition of teamworking based on 
autonomy with the existence of team-based forms of work organization in which autonomy is 
largely absent? 
The second, empirical, puzzle concerns the results of research we undertook on the 
operation of teamworking in the UK’s tax assessment and collection service, the Inland 
Revenue.  Teamworking was recognised by employees as representing a significant change in 
the way in which their work was organized.  It was also seen by management as being 
effective in terms of performance.  At the same time, however, teamworking in the Inland 
Revenue appeared to lack a number of the characteristics generally associated with this form 
of work organization.  Its introduction had seen little increase in employee flexibility and -- in 
parallel to our first puzzle -- there had been little in the way of enhanced employee autonomy. 
 This paper suggests that the answers to these two puzzles lie in the same place.  An 
understanding of teamworking in the Inland Revenue, we argue, can best be developed by 
emphasising interdependence rather than autonomy.  More specifically, use of the idea of 
outcome interdependence allows us to identify what we call ‘target-based’ teamworking.  
This, in turn, allows us to suggest that in addressing ‘the issue of autonomy’, some advantage 
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might be gained by looking not just at autonomy but at how autonomy and interdependence 
interact. 
 The rest of the paper’s introductory section will focus on the first of our two puzzles.  
We shall see how a conception of teamworking based on autonomy excludes from 
consideration a number of team-based forms of work organization, perhaps the most 
important of which are those associated with Japanese-style ‘lean’ production.  A number of 
ways of addressing this issue have been put forward, but each of them, we argue, fails to 
resolve it satisfactorily.  It is in this context that we examine the concept of interdependence.  
This examination is structured around two main issues: the relationship between task and 
outcome interdependence, and the relationship between interdependence and autonomy. 
 In the body of the paper we see how our second, empirical, puzzle arose.  We shall 
see that teamworking in the Inland Revenue takes on a particular form.  The shift from 
‘individual allocations’ to ‘group allocations’ of work was associated with no great 
enhancement of employee autonomy and no systematic shift in the direction of employee 
flexibility.  The application of concepts of interdependence allows us to interpret these 
changes and, with that, to develop the idea of target-based teamworking.  
 In the paper’s final section we return to the issues raised in the introduction.  There is 
no claim that target-based teamworking will or should arise in all circumstances, and we 
identify some of the contingent factors that appear to be important in our case study.  Having 
shown how our second puzzle might be resolved by having teamworking in the Inland 
Revenue understood in terms of the interdependencies it engenders, we examine what our 
case implies for the relationship between autonomy and interdependence.  This then allows us 
to say something about our first, conceptual, puzzle.  An understanding of teamworking, we 
argue, might benefit from seeing it in terms not of autonomy alone but of how autonomy and 
interdependence interact. 
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Teamworking and Autonomy 
 
Teamworking has emerged in recent years as one of the most important ways in which work is 
being re-organized.   The most recent Workplace Employee Relations Survey, for example, 
found that 65 per cent of UK workplaces reported the use of team-based working for at least 
some of their employees (Cully et al., 1999: 42).   Although teamworking is an idea with a long 
history (see Buchanan, 2000), we follow Procter & Mueller (2000: 3) here in arguing that in its 
current manifestation 'its chief distinguishing characteristic is that it is in some sense "strategic".'  
Rather than the design of work having as its focus the well-being of employees, it has come to 
be concerned with the way in which organizations deal with fundamental questions regarding 
their customers and competitors (Buchanan, 1994).  
 Seen from this perspective, the organization of work under teamworking is centred on 
two concepts: flexibility and autonomy.  Flexibility follows to some degree from the basis on 
which teams are established.  Because teams will often have responsibility for a particular 
product line or a particular group of customers, the relationship between teamworking and 
flexibility can be a close one.  Reorganizing production on this basis has the effect--indeed, 
often, the intention--of making functional specialisation difficult to maintain.  In a 
manufacturing setting, the introduction of cellular production offers a good example of the 
application of these principles (Procter et al., 1995). 
 For the purposes of this paper it is autonomy rather than flexibility that we want to 
emphasise.    In any case, it can plausibly be argued that autonomy is the concept most 
closely associated with teamworking.  According to Sinclair (1992: 613), ‘team theorists 
almost inexorably end up looking for decision-making as the predominant group work 
indicator’.   To understand the theoretical underpinnings of this association we need to look at 
sociotechnical systems (STS) theory, and, in particular, at its concept of the autonomous 
work group (AWG).  As Manz (1992: 1121) argues, the ‘joint optimization’ of the social and 
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technical aspects of the organization of work usually involves a ‘shift in focus from 
individual to group methods’.  Underlying this is ‘the view that a group can more effectively 
apply its resources to address work condition variances within the group than can individual 
employees working separately’ (1992: 1121).   
 Although these ideas provide us with a theoretical understanding of teamworking, this 
is not the same thing as saying that teamworking in practice is always the result of their 
application.  Certainly--although the linkage may sometimes be no more than superficial 
(Thompson & Wallace, 1996)--we can see cases in which STS theory has played a direct role 
in the introduction of teamworking (Benders & Van Hootegem, 1999).   There are, however, 
a number of sources from which the rationale for teamworking might emerge.  Indeed, 
Buchanan (2000) shows how the early development of STS theory in the 1950s was itself 
based on pre-existing arrangements of work which had emerged spontaneously in such 
settings as UK coal mines and Indian textile mills.  The more recent re-emergence of 
autonomous teams has taken place under a variety of labels (Benders & Van Hootegem, 
1999).  In the UK, for example, cellular manufacturing was one of the most important 
channels through which teamworking was introduced in the 1980s and 1990s (Benders & 
Van Hootegem, 1999).  More recently we have seen customer- or product-focussed teams 
emerging as part of such developments as Business Process Reengineering (Hammer & 
Champy, 1993) and ‘strategic segmentation’ (Batt, 2000).   In the same vein, Mueller et al. 
(2000) identify a number of  discrete ‘trajectories’ for teamworking, amongst which STS 
theory lines up alongside ‘humanization of work’ and ‘employee involvement’.  
 Indeed, in order to understand fully the strength of the relationship between 
teamworking and autonomy, we can approach it from the opposite direction and see 
teamworking as part of the broader movement towards the greater direct involvement of 
employees in organizational decision-making.   Whether we call this direct participation 
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(Marchington & Wilkinson, 2000), employee involvement (Marchington, 2000) or 
empowerment (Wilkinson, 1998),  the key argument is that the increasing volatility of 
markets and the acceleration of technological change make necessary an enhanced role for 
employees in decisions about how their work is organized.  This can take the form of the 
involvement of individual employees, but increasingly it has meant a greater degree of 
autonomy at the level of the team.  Marchington (2000), for example, explicitly considers 
teamworking as an extension of  existing forms of employee involvement; while in 
Wilkinson’s (1998) classification of forms of empowerment, ‘task autonomy’ is expected to 
involve the restructuring of work around semi-autonomous teams.  
 We can go a stage further than this by looking at both teamworking and involvement 
as important parts of high-performance work systems (HPWSs).   For Boxall & Purcell 
(2003: 103) these new systems’ attempts to foster employee commitment are ‘most usually 
achieved through the extensive adoption of teamworking as the fundamental building block 
of the organization’.  Whitfield & Poole (1997) see employee involvement as characteristic of 
HPWSs, with teamworking being a major part of this.  Similarly, Appelbaum & Batt (1994) 
identify ‘American Team Production’ as one of the two major types of HPWS, its chief 
distinguishing characteristic being its emphasis on worker participation in decision-making.   
 It is at this point, however, that we encounter our first puzzle: Benders & Van 
Hootegem’s (1999) ‘issue of autonomy’.  The issue is that a reliance on autonomy in 
definitions of teamworking means that some forms of work organization that are generally 
thought of as being team-based are excluded from consideration.  In particular we are 
thinking of the groups that form part of the archetypal Japanese system of ‘lean’ production.  
Although Womack et al. (1990: 99) claimed that ‘in the end, it is the dynamic work team that 
emerges as the heart of the lean factory’, the members of such teams do not have the 
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autonomy possessed -- at least in principle -- by members of an AWG (Benders & Van 
Hootegem, 1999). 
 There are a number of ways in which this issue can be approached.  One line of 
argument is that we should include within a team’s autonomy the discretion exercised by the 
team leader (Benders & Van Hootegem, 1999; see also Delbridge et al., 2000).  Although this 
allows the Japanese teams to be considered autonomous, it does so only by stretching the 
conception of autonomy almost to breaking point.   A second possibility, and the one 
favoured by Benders & Van Hootegem (1999), is a case-by-case approach, in which 
teamworking is defined according to the research questions being addressed.  Although this 
has the attraction of avoiding too restrictive a definition, the danger is of ‘teams’ or 
‘teamworking’ coming to have almost no meaning at all. 
  A third possibility is to ‘solve the issue of autonomy by considering it as a variable 
rather than as a defining characteristic’ (Benders & Van Hootegem, 1999: 618).  This is the 
position taken by, for example, Mueller (1994: 383-4).  As Benders & Van Hootegem (1999) 
point out, although Mueller’s definition of a team has the merit of encompassing both 
Japanese teams and AWGs, it is able to do so only by also covering a variety of forms of 
work organization that many would find it difficult to regard as teamworking.  At the same 
time, in trying to avoid being too vague, Mueller’s definition includes elements (eg the 
stricture that a team should have between 8 and 15 members) that appear arbitrary and 
restrictive. 
 It is in any case very difficult to make a clear distinction between 
autonomy-as-variable and autonomy-as-defining-characteristic.  For one thing, if autonomy is 
disregarded as the defining characteristic, then, to fulfil this function, we are left with little 
more than the size of the group.   Even if we treat autonomy as a variable, we still have a 
situation in which groups with greater degrees of autonomy are seen as being stronger or 
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more pure forms of team than those in which autonomy is more limited.  Koch and Buhl 
(2001), for example, distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ teams, with the latter 
characterised by ‘little development of autonomy and decision latitude’ (2001: 165).  A 
similar approach is implicit in the UK WERS survey (Cully et al., 1999: 42-44), which 
delineates a number of different forms of teamworking on the basis of the depth of team 
members’ decision-making responsibility.  Likewise, the pan-European EPOC survey 
(Benders et al., 2001) identifies three forms of teamworking on the basis of a metric that 
combines the proportion of employees working in groups with a measure of the extent of 
group decision-making. 
 The danger is, of course, is that it becomes very difficult to distinguish between teams 
and ‘non-teams’.   If we accept that any group has some degree of decision-making 
autonomy, however small, then at what point do we say that it becomes a team?  On the basis 
of the ‘strongest’ definitions in the 1998 WERS and the 1995/96 EPOC survey, only 3% and 
4% of workplaces respectively could be said to have teamworking (Cully et al., 1999: 43; 
Benders et al., 2001: 207).  The rarity of such a phenomenon would seem to make it barely 
worth studying. 
 There are two things we can do to try and extricate ourselves from this apparently 
debilitating situation.  First, at a general level, we must remind ourselves about what we are 
looking at.  Our concern is not with how teams of any kind operate in any set of 
circumstances.  We are looking at contemporary employing organizations for whom, as we 
have argued, teamworking is a management strategy for the organization of work, the aim of 
which is to improve organizational performance. ‘Teams,’ as Thompson & Wallace 
(1996:105) express it, ‘are an instrument of redesign, not ends in themselves.’  By 
delimitating our area of concern in this way we are going some way towards the case-by-case 
approach advocated by Benders & Van Hootegem (1999).  It might also be claimed that this 
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or any other delimitation is essentially arbitrary in nature.   Although we have some sympathy 
for both these points, we would argue that it is necessary to make some degree of delimitation 
in what we understand by teamworking.  The general concept we are using here, moreover, is 
wide enough to get us round the ‘issue of autonomy’ -- by being able to encompass both 
teams that are based on autonomy and those that are not -- whilst at the same time being 
narrow enough to carry significant meaning.    Stressing the ‘strategic’ aspect of teamworking 
also helps us avoid the question of having to say at what point a ‘group’ becomes a ‘team’.  
Put crudely, we are concerned not so much with how much, say, autonomy teams might have, 
as with the motivations for and effects of teams being given more autonomy.  
 The second thing we can do is to look at the principles upon which the managerial 
strategy of teamworking is based.  Here we follow Parker et al.’s (2001) review of research 
on work design.  This calls for a more systematic treatment of teamworking, one that moves 
away from an over-reliance on such ‘traditional’ (2001: 422) concerns as autonomy.  Such an 
approach would have ‘a broader set of work characteristics to draw from’ and would 
recognise that ‘the relative salience of particular work characteristics will depend on the 
context’ (2001: 424).  
 It is these two calls that we take up in the present paper.  As we have noted, our study 
of the Inland Revenue left us with a puzzle. It revealed a form of teamworking in which 
autonomy and flexibility played little part.  As we shall see, an understanding of the operation 
of teamworking in this setting involves a much greater emphasis being placed on concepts of 
interdependence.  Before we can present our case study, therefore, it is to the idea of 
interdependence that we must turn. 
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Teamworking and Interdependence 
A useful starting point is provided by Thompson's (1967) Organizations in Action, in which he 
identifies three forms of interdependence: pooled, sequential and reciprocal.  Pooled 
interdependence refers to a situation in which each part of the organization makes a discrete 
contribution to output: interdependence exists in the sense that 'unless each performs adequately, 
the total organization is jeopardized' (1967: 54).  For sequential interdependence to exist, the 
outputs of one part of the organization must be the inputs of another; while reciprocal 
interdependence means that this sequential interdependence is not simply all one way: ‘the 
outputs of each become inputs for the others' (1967: 55).  The three forms of interdependence 
are thus to be understood as ascending in order of complexity, with sequential interdependence 
necessarily including pooled, and reciprocal necessarily including both pooled and sequential.  
 Although these forms of interdependence were applied originally to the relationship 
between different parts of the organization, they can quite easily be extended to cover the 
relationship between individual jobs.  In the case of pooled interdependence, individual workers 
would work in parallel, each doing basically the same job; sequential interdependence would 
most easily be conceptualised in terms of the relationship between workers on an assembly line; 
while reciprocal interdependence would be what members of a work team would experience. 
 When applied to issues of work organization, we can break down the idea of 
interdependence in another way:  into task and outcome interdependence. Task interdependence 
can, in turn, be divided into its non-discretionary and discretionary elements.  Thus in order to, 
say, build a car or treat a patient, certain tasks must be performed and some must be performed 
in a certain order, but there is also some flexibility in how these tasks are allocated both between 
groups and, within groups, between individuals.  Wageman (1995) captures some of the 
relationship between the non-discretionary and the discretionary elements of task 
interdependence in her distinction between task inputs and the process of execution.  What 
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complicates matters is that in the process of execution, discretion can be exercised either by 
management or in the behaviour of team members themselves.  
 The second main form of interdependence in work, outcome interdependence, can be 
defined as 'the degree to which significant outcomes an individual receives depend on the 
performance of others' (Wageman, 1995: 147).   This also can be divided into two: goal and 
reward.  The former covers such things as group production targets; the latter, financial reward 
in its various forms.   
 The outcome/task distinction and Thompson's classification map onto each other quite 
neatly.  Pooled interdependence might be thought of as representing a situation in which only 
outcome interdependence applies: the interdependence lies in the simple addition of individual 
efforts.  Sequential interdependence can then be seen as adding a measure of task 
interdependence to this situation; and reciprocal interdependence, as making this task 
interdependence more complex.  Important here is that the more complex the form of 
interdependence, the more difficult and more costly it is to co-ordinate and control.  The 
introduction of teamworking, in introducing reciprocal interdependence to a situation of 
sequential or even pooled interdependence, would, from a management point of view, have to be 
capable of generating compensatory benefits. 
 In much of the research applying interdependence to issues of work organization, it is 
task rather than outcome interdependence that has been the focus of attention.  With job design 
theory dominated from the 1970s onwards by the Job Characteristics Model, attempts were 
made to incorporate interdependence into it.   Kiggundu (1981, 1983) approached this in a direct 
fashion by proposing that task interdependence be included in the model as a key job 
characteristic.  Although his own test of this theory offered him some encouragement, his 
findings relate primarily to the design of individual jobs (Kiggundu, 1983), and it is only more 
recently that this concern with task interdependence has been carried over into research on team-
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based forms of work organization.  In this context Sprigg et al. (2000) identified task 
interdependence as important in determining the effects of work design on employee strain and 
satisfaction.  Looking at two different production processes in the same manufacturing 
company, they found that where interdependence was low, the introduction of teamworking was 
associated with lower levels of satisfaction and higher levels of strain. 
 Other research in team-based settings has been more concerned with outcome 
interdependence and, in particular, with its relationship with task interdependence.  Saavedra 
et al. (1993) combined these two forms with feedback interdependence in order to generate what 
they call 'complex' interdependence.  Their experiment-based approach did provide some 
support for the idea that task and outcome interdependence should be congruent with each other.  
Given the way we have characterised teamworking earlier in the paper, however, we would 
support Shea and Guzzo (1987a: 351) in their contention that insight is better generated through 
studies of 'natural' work settings. 
 On the question of the relationship between task and outcome interdependence, there are 
two bodies of work that are of particular interest.  The first is Wageman's (1995) examination 
of the impact of introducing three different levels of outcome interdependence 
(individual-based reward, group-based reward or some 'hybrid' of the two) to each of a 
number of groups of Xerox service technicians exhibiting different levels of task 
interdependence (again, individual, group or hybrid).  This was a wide-ranging study but two 
of her conclusions are of especial interest.  The first is that, when the groups were assessed in 
terms of performance, there was no simple congruency between task and outcome 
interdependence.  The worst performers were those groups with hybrid outcomes or tasks, but 
even those with hybrid tasks and outcomes were out-performed by groups that combined, 
say, individual-based tasks with group-based outcomes. 
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 Wageman's second conclusion concerned the question of whether outcome and task 
interdependence, although conceptually quite separate, are in fact experienced as such.  Her 
findings suggested that while task interdependence affected employees' experienced outcome 
interdependence, the reverse was not the case.  For Wageman, therefore, it is task 
interdependence that is the dominant force in the relationship.  'The pivot,' she argues (1995: 
173), 'is how the work is structured … it is most essential to create real task interdependence 
and then support the task design with interdependent rewards.' 
 The second body of work that addresses the relationship between task and outcome 
interdependence is that of Shea & Guzzo (1987a, 1987b).    In contrast to Wageman's 
findings they place the emphasis very much on the role played by outcome interdependence, 
which, in their model, is able to have a direct impact on group effectiveness.  Task 
interdependence can be of effect only indirectly, through either outcome interdependence or 
'potency', the collective belief of the group that it can be effective. 
 Shea & Guzzo's (1987b) own testing of their model gives it only limited support.  
Using survey evidence to examine the impact of the introduction of a team bonus for sales 
teams in a large retail company, they found a clear link between outcome interdependence 
and team members' own evaluation of customer service.  On the other hand, when sales was 
taken as the measure of effectiveness, it could not be linked with the hypothesized variables.  
What most surprised the researchers was the degree of change that team members were able 
themselves to effect in task interdependence.  'We regard task interdependence as malleable,' 
argue Shea & Guzzo (1987b: 30), 'especially when the group's work is not highly constrained 
by technology'.  In contrast to Wageman, they conclude that managers should attend to the 
issue of outcome interdependence and should leave to the group members the development of 
patterns of task interdependence. 
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 This last point leads us to our final issue concerning interdependence: its relationship 
with autonomy.  The most explicit attempt to deal with this issue is provided by Liden et al. 
(1997), who look at task interdependence as a moderator of the relationship between group 
autonomy and performance.  On the basis of a survey of work groups in two US organizations, 
their findings were that where interdependence was high, high levels of autonomy were 
associated with high levels of performance, but when interdependence was low, high levels of 
autonomy were associated with low levels of performance.  Thus by taking interdependence into 
account, they argued, sense could be made of previous mixed findings on the relationship 
between autonomy and performance. 
 
This review of the literature on interdependence provides us with a framework within which we 
can attempt to resolve the two puzzles with which we began this paper.  Taking the second 
puzzle first, there are two ways in which using concepts of interdependence allows us to 
interpret the operation of teamworking in the Inland Revenue.  First, as we shall see in the 
course of the paper, the basic concepts of interdependence are extremely useful in developing an 
understanding of the form teamworking takes in this case.   Second, looking at the case in this 
way allows us to develop insights into the key issues we have just identified: the relationship 
between task and outcome interdependence and the relationship between interdependence and 
autonomy.   This last point in turn leads us back to the first of our original puzzles.  How we 
might address the ‘issue of autonomy’ is by shifting the emphasis from autonomy itself to the 
relationship between autonomy and interdependence.  
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The Case Study: the Inland Revenue 
The Inland Revenue 
The Inland Revenue is the UK's tax assessment and collection department.   At the time this 
research was undertaken it employed over 52,000 people.   Its main operating unit was the 
district office, of which there were between 500 and 600 spread across the country.   The size 
of office varied from around 50-60 staff up to around 500.  Under a programme of 
organizational restructuring, both the number of staff and the number of district offices were 
in decline. 
Under the Inland Revenue's grading system, staff are placed in one of five pay bands, A 
to E, with A being the highest.  Within the district offices, the jobs and responsibilities 
associated with Band E staff-- divided between E1 and E2 (accounting for 34 per cent and 27 
per cent of staff respectively in 1997)-- and Band D staff (22 per cent) are as follows: 
• Revenue Assistant (RA) (Band E2): work at this level is made up of basic clerical tasks 
such as receiving mail, record-keeping and sorting and filing documents. 
• Revenue Officer (RO) (E1): ROs are concerned with the routine calculation and 
collection of tax.  They would also be the point of contact for members of the public. 
• Revenue Executive (RE) (D): REs deal with more complex tax cases and provide 
technical support to ROs and REs. 
 
The Research Project 
In order to undertake the research, access to six district offices was negotiated through an 
initial contact in the Inland Revenue's central Human Resources Division (HRD).  The 
offices were chosen by the HRD on the basis of their providing a range of sizes, types and 
experiences of teamworking.  Over the period December 1998 - February 1999 one or both of 
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the researchers spent two days in each office, carrying out a series of hour-long, 
semi-structured interviews.  Although the nature of the research entailed some degree of 
variation, the interviews were structured around the following topic areas: the understanding 
of teamworking, the reasons for its introduction, the nature of work under teamworking, the 
nature of management, the organizational infrastructure, and the success of teamworking.  
The interviewees were chosen by the researchers' point of contact within each of the offices, 
who was asked to provide people from a range of functions, grades and points of view.  A 
total of 74 people were interviewed in the offices, a figure that includes 23 Band D 
employees, 27 Band E1 and 8 Band E2.  In addition, interviews were carried out with 
members of the HRD and Training Office.  The researchers were also given access to a wide 
range of official documentation--strategy documents, organizational charts, internal 
memoranda etc. 
 
Teamworking in the Inland Revenue: Background and Objectives 
We observed in our introduction that teamworking has increasingly come to be associated 
with organizations' strategic objectives, and this was certainly the case in the Inland Revenue.  
At a general level it was seen as part of the move to make the Inland Revenue a more 
'customer-driven' or business-like organization.   More specifically, teamworking was 
inextricably bound up with two important organizational changes.  The first of these was the 
introduction of the 'self-assessment' (SA) of tax liability for a large number of taxpayers in 
1997/98.  Throughout the period of SA's introduction, the move to teamworking was a key 
component of recommendations made by central management to those working in the district 
offices. 
Although many of our interviewees associated SA and teamworking with each other, 
there was not a clear and unified view on the nature of this link.   One view was that it was 
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simply the scale and complexity of change that made it difficult to continue to organize work 
on an individualised basis.  Teamworking was thus seen as offering the organizational 
flexibility necessary to effect so important a change.  A more cynical view was that 
teamworking was merely a way of getting increasing volumes of work from declining 
numbers of staff.  In common with other areas of the public sector, the Inland Revenue was 
under constant pressure to produce efficiency gains.  Allocating work to groups rather than to 
individuals not only made some of this intensification less obvious, but it provided the means 
by which it could more easily be extended: 'it just seems to be a very backdoor way of getting 
us to take on more work without us really realising it,' said one RO (Revenue Officer). 
The second important organizational change was the process of ‘delayering’ that had 
been introduced a couple of years before teamworking.   One layer of management within the 
district offices had been removed completely, the objective being that there should be no 
more than one layer between the head of the office and anyone else within it.  This carried 
with it fundamental implications for the role of what was called the Front-Line Manager or 
FLM (generally a Band D employee), who now operated as this sole intermediary level.   Not 
only was the level of responsibility of FLMs thereby greatly enhanced, but they were also 
expected to embody a change towards a less directive and more facilitative style of 
management.  
 These strategic objectives and structural changes were accompanied by direct 
attempts to engender a culture of teamworking in the Inland Revenue.  Prominent amongst 
these was the dissemination by the HRD of a Team Development Pack (TDP), a training 
package consisting of eight modules designed to take teams through various stages of 
development.  The use of the TDP was at the discretion of the head of each district office, 
and, in the offices visited by the researchers, either the package had not been used at all or it 
had been abandoned after two or three modules.  Overall it appeared to have had little impact.  
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'We drew up a team charter,' said one RO.  'I don't know whatever happened to it.  I've never 
seen it since.'  Although time pressures were cited in defence of this failure, it also reflected a 
widespread scepticism about what were considered to be the 'softer' aspects of teamworking.  
One interviewee dismissed the TDP as 'party games'; another called it a 'criminal waste of 
taxpayers' money'. 
 
Teamworking in the Inland Revenue 
From Individual to Group Allocations 
 
We must first of all establish what precisely was meant by teamworking in the Inland 
Revenue.  In essence, as one RO (Revenue Officer) expressed it, 'it is not having your own 
individual work; it is having work which belongs to the team, and then doing it as part of the 
team'.  According to two other ROs: 
 
… you just all work from the one pot instead of having your own little pots. 
 
You are looking at a whole cake instead of just the slices. 
 
 
And for one member of the central HRD: 
 
 
… instead of each having your own bucket of work, you just put a bigger bucket in 
the middle and people go and help themselves as and when they're ready. 
 
 
Whether expressed in terms of pots, cakes or buckets, what teamworking meant was a 
shift from 'individual allocations' to ‘group allocations’ of work.  Under the former, each RO 
had been allocated a certain set of taxpayers, usually on the basis of the taxpayer's surname.  
One person would take A-E, the next F-J, and so on.  The individual would then take 
responsibility for the standard processing of all work associated with these taxpayers.  Under 
the new system of teamworking, allocations of taxpayers were made not to individuals but to 
groups of ROs.  Thus a group of, say, five or six ROs would be jointly responsible for an 
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allocation containing, for the sake of example, taxpayers with surnames beginning with letter 
A-M.   
This move from individual to group or team allocations was a fundamental change.  
Individual allocations had provided a strong sense of identity and had often been jealously 
guarded: 'if anybody tried to take my allocation of work off me,' said one Band D employee, 
'I'd have done murder for it.’    But an attachment to individual allocations was not just a 
question of unthinking resistance to change.  It was widely held amongst interviewees that 
the system had offered advantages from the point of view of customer service. Taxpayers had 
an identifiable point of contact with the Revenue, and this point of contact had a thorough 
knowledge of them and their case.  In the words of one RO: 
 
… you had pride in your work.  It was your work and you had continuity of dealing 
with people … And they knew you were dealing with it, you dealt with it for a length 
of time and you got to build a relationship with the person you were dealing with. 
 
 
The system of individual allocation had not been without its disadvantages.  Many of 
those interviewed explained how their work would build up when they were away on holiday.  
More generally, others associated individual allocations with pressure and isolation.  One 
FLM said: 
 
… it was really each man for himself.  It was rather a secretive thing as well, that 
individuals on their own allocation work would not necessarily know what other 
people's work position was.  There would be lots of, ‘Psst, have you heard?  
Such-and-such, she's got fifty more pieces of post than me,’ that sort of thing. 
 
 
Whatever the attitude taken towards it, we can perhaps best understand the shift from 
individual to group allocations as the replacement of pooled by reciprocal interdependence.  
With individual allocations, interdependence arises simply from the adding together of each 
employee’s discrete inputs.  In its introduction of group allocations of work, what 
teamworking does is to open up the possibility of making the relationship between employees 
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much more complex.  To examine the different forms this took we turn now to the question 
of how the work of a team was divided between its members. 
 
Employee Autonomy in the Division of Work  
As we observed above, the corollary of teamworking in the Inland Revenue was the transition 
to a more facilitative style of management on the part of the Front-Line Managers or FLMs.  
This meant that it was up to the group members -- in consultation with their FLM -- to decide 
how their allocation should be worked.  In practice, the role of the FLM in this process was 
often a very limited one.  This was in part due to the change in management style, but FLM 
involvement was also curtailed by the amount of administrative work their new role required 
of them. 'I assume they [the FLMs] are working behind the scenes,' said one team member, 
'doing whatever the managers do'. 
It is thus here that we see the introduction of the limited degree of autonomy that the 
move to teamworking involved.  Capturing our earlier distinction between task inputs and the 
process of execution, there was some degree of discretion over the extent of interdependence, 
and, at least in part, this discretion was exercised by the workers themselves.  One possibility 
was that the team members would use this discretion to revert to a system in which they each 
had an individual allocation of taxpayers.  One RO (Revenue Officer) described her 
experiences: 
 
… the work was literally split up like it was before teamworking came in.  I would 
actually deal with everybody's name that began from A-D … and so on and so forth. 
 
 
Although in theory such an allocation of work was possible under the new system, our own 
investigations suggested that recidivism of this nature was very rare. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a second possibility was that the group allocation 
would be divided so that team members were each dealing not with certain taxpayers but with 
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certain types of work.  In Thompson's (1967) terms, this move from individual allocations to 
functional specialisation would be seen as the replacement of pooled interdependence by 
sequential interdependence.  From the point of view of the FLMs, some degree of 
specialisation was welcomed on the grounds of efficiency.  Somewhat paradoxically it could 
also be seen as a way of retaining some of the benefits of individual allocations.  According 
to one FLM: 
 
… they've got something they're responsible for, which is what they lost when they 
lost the allocations that we used to have … and most people do like to have something 
to call their own, don't they? 
 
 
Overall, however, the degree of functional specialisation appeared to be quite limited.   
Many aspects of work in the Inland Revenue had to be undertaken at a certain time of year, 
and thus did not lend themselves to being dealt with in this way.  For the most part, functional 
specialisation related to tasks that constituted only a small proportion of both the group's and 
the individual's work.  One RO said: 
 
… we get things like returned cheques, and one particular person handles all those, so 
you know there is somebody to give them to that knows just exactly what to do to get 
it dealt with as fast as they can. 
 
 
In looking at the way in which group allocations were divided up, therefore, both 
individual allocations and functional specialisation existed largely as conceptual possibilities.  
In between these two extremes, what we observed in operation was a whole range of more 
rough-and-ready means of dividing up work.  One RO described how their group started off 
teamworking by each team member taking a folder of correspondence, working through it, 
taking another, and so on.  Problems arose, however, 'when you realise that the person sitting 
next to you has only done two bits that day and you've done, like, thirty'.   This apparently 
 24 
straightforward system -- working on what might be called the 'cab-rank' principle -- could 
thus be quite difficult to operate effectively.  An RO described the difficulties: 
 
… we worked everything as it came in.  You went to the post and got ten pieces of 
post-work done, then you went back and got more.  So everything was very random, 
there was not a lot of continuity … I don't think it worked particularly well. 
 
 
What the move away from individual allocations implied was that the work associated 
with a particular taxpayer would now be done by different people at different times.    The 
work relationships between members of the group were now much more complex: rather than 
the pooled interdependence of individual allocations we have a system based on reciprocal 
interdependence.  This brought with it a number of issues.  The problems in picking up a case 
from a fellow team member could be a source of dissatisfaction.  One RO put it as follows: 
 
… the frustrating part for me is you open a file and things have gone on before and 
you have sit there and think, 'What on earth has been going on?', because it's not 
always easy to follow the way other people work.  
 
 
That the case would then be passed on to someone else, moreover, meant that it was 
unlikely that any employee would gain the satisfaction from seeing it worked through in its 
entirety.  According to an FLM: 
 
… you could pick up a really grotty case, and you could spend two days doing it, and 
you could write out, a reply would come in and you'd never see it again--Fred Bloggs 
next door would handle it.  So you've done all that work, you've put all that effort in, 
the reply might just be, 'Thanks very much for that.  Yes, I agree your calculations', 
but unless Fred Bloggs shows it to you and says, 'They've agreed, that's a good bit of 
work', you're never going to know. 
 
 
 The overall effect, it was argued, was that the taxpayer was likely to receive a poorer 
service.  In the words of one RO: 
 
… the taxpayer could have one of six people handling his case.  He could ring up one 
day and someone will say, 'Oh, I don't know anything about you' … If you can be 
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straight on the ball, because you know the case … to me it's a far more efficient 
service. 
 
 
 We can thus see the introduction of teamworking in the Inland Revenue as being a 
move to a more complex and in some ways more costly form of work organization.  So far, 
however, we have looked only at the work of the Revenue Officers.  In order to appreciate 
the full implications of teamworking, we need also to look at their relationship with other 
groups of workers. 
 
Employee Flexibility in Multi-function/Multi-band Teams 
Although the concept of teamworking in the Inland Revenue was centred on the move of the 
Revenue Officers (ROs) to group allocations of work, a second important intention was that 
teams would be 'multi-process' or 'multi-functional'.  In line with the broader strategic 
objectives we outlined earlier, there would, in short, be an element of task flexibility.  Thus, 
as well as ROs, teams would contain both RAs (Revenue Assistants), whose work was of a 
very simple clerical nature, and REs (Revenue Executives), who dealt with the more difficult 
and technical aspects of cases.  Matters were complicated by the fact that task flexibility in 
the Inland Revenue involved individuals’ taking on work not so much in different areas as at 
different levels of responsibility.  What might be described as multi-process or multi-
functional teams could also be seen -- and were also referred to -- as multi-band or multi-
grade ones.  Flexibility was thus of a 'vertical' rather than a 'horizontal' nature.   
Even a limited degree of flexibility proved difficult to achieve in these circumstances.  
Although in a number of the offices the ending of individual allocations was marked by a 
formal attempt to institute these multi-band teams, what we observed in practice was a move 
away from this ideal-type.  In one office, Office X, there was resistance to the idea that an 
individual's identification with their team should to some degree replace their identification 
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with their grade. As a result of these considerations, changes were introduced in the way 
teamworking was structured.  Rather than having four REs (Revenue Executives) on each of 
six teams, the REs as a whole were constituted into a single group. 'That hasn't in any way 
changed the support that those REs give to the ROs and the RAs …' said one manager in the 
office, 'It's just that they have got their own identity back again and they feel a lot happier'.  
With the RAs (Revenue Assistants) reconstituted in a similar way, this left teamworking 
confined to the RO (Revenue Officer) grade.   
In a second office, Office Y, the formal introduction of multi-band teams had seen 
only a very slight blurring of distinctions between the work of the different grades.  On the 
whole, grade distinctions were retained: 'it's just the RAs doing the RA jobs and the ROs 
doing the RO jobs,' said one RA, 'and they are sort of clonked together'.  Many employees 
found it difficult to describe where the boundaries of their own team lay.  One RO described 
the position in their team: 
 
There are nine people in [my team] at the moment.  Five are at RO level and four at 
RE level.  We've got two Revenue Assistants which are supposed to be with our team 
but because they don't sit with us at all they are not really attached to us.  Only the 
ROs and REs sit together at the moment. 
 
 
In this case even the ROs and the REs were separate from each other:  'all the REs work 
together and all the ROs work together, so we are divided a bit.'  Although at a formal level 
the idea of the multi-band team had been retained, the de facto situation in Office Y was not 
far from the formal reversion to an essentially grade-based system that we had observed in 
Office X. 
 It is at this point that we can see the emergence of the empirical puzzle described in 
the introduction to this paper.  Employees recognised that the shift from individual 
allocations to group allocations was a significant change in the way in which their work was 
organized.  At the same time, autonomy had been extended only so far as to cover how work 
 27 
was to be allocated within each team; and, despite management intentions, there had been 
little systematic increase in employee flexibility.  In order to understand what was most 
important in the operation of teamworking in the Inland Revenue, we turn now to a 
consideration of the teams’ work targets. 
 
Target-based Teamworking: Towards Outcome Interdependence 
When asked about teamworking and what it implied for their own work, many interviewees 
answered by comparing it with what had existed before.  In line with the broader changes 
taking place in the Inland Revenue, there was a widespread recognition that the emphasis 
now was very much on results.  One senior employee compared what he saw as the 'old' and 
the 'new' systems: 
 
… the new one now … is very work orientated.  The other one … I think it's maybe, 
'If you work in a team and you get the spirit, if you like, or the feeling right, the work 
will take care of itself.'  Work was definitely second, or results I should say, perhaps 
more than work. 
 
 
Comparing the current situation with when she had resumed employment in the early 1990s, 
one RO (Revenue Officer) said, 'the pressure is on the target work.  I think the emphasis was, 
years ago, that it didn't matter how long it took to reply to a person making an enquiry as long 
as you eventually get the reply'.  Another RO expressed similar views: 
 
In the days when I first started-- we are talking about 20 years ago here-- there wasn't 
the targets then … the whole structure of the Revenue's changed, which meant that 
everybody is looking towards greater efficiency, again in targets: we must clear 
targets by a certain time. 
 
 
With little direct mutual identification between team members, we can go as far as to 
say that, more than anything, it was the work target that defined the team.  One team member 
described this: 
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… we all have targets we have to meet, so we all work together to meet the target.  
You can't say we work as a team like at a building site, because it's impossible to sit 
there and observe a team working as a team … But we all do the same thing, if 
necessary, or the same type of work, in order to clear our targets. 
 
 
It is this that we can describe as a target-based form of teamworking.  What it means 
in day-to-day terms is that individuals will take on work with their team target in mind.  In 
the words of one RO: 
 
… there was no team type of thing before, you were always an individual working … 
It was more like, 'If you finish that … if you've got time … do something,' and you 
used to be, 'Alright'.  There was never no urgency to do it.  Whereas now it's, like, 
'When you've done that, do this' … you make sure you do it because you know that 
the team falls down and the manager will say, 'We've got to meet these targets …' 
 
 
A number of other examples were offered by interviewees.  One said: 
 
 
… rather than …, 'I've done my 150 a week', or whatever, and somebody else has 
only done 100 and I'll say, 'Oh well, you know,' … nowadays I'll say, 'Oh well, I'll do 
50 then, so that we've both done 150,' … so it looks good that the team has done it, 
but it also looks good on the individual … because he's done more to help the team 
achieve 300, he's done two thirds, but at the end of the day the team has done 300 … 
 
 
 All this should not be taken to mean that the team target replaced completely the 
individual targets that employees had.  In fact, the performance management system 
continued to be based very much on the appraisal of the individual.  What was new was not 
an emphasis on targets but an emphasis on team targets.   While individual targets continued 
to exist, the difference was that they were now seen much more in terms of the contribution 
they made to the team target.  A comment from one RO captures the spirit of this: 'with 
teamworking we are doing the same jobs but we are doing them combined'.  This was echoed 
in another comment: 
 
… our very first team meetings, we used to have when I first started, would be like a 
work state report of how each individual is doing and how the group is doing.  But it 
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was a group and not a team … Whereas now it's like how the whole team is doing and 
you can take more of a collective pride in how we are all doing. 
 
The team target, in turn, could be defined in terms of the contribution it made to the office or 
district target.  According to an FLM: 
 
people just work together in, whatever, smaller teams, bearing in mind they're part of 
[a] bigger team, in the sense of the office.  Prior to that, for the majority of staff, they 
felt very much individual [sic].  It's what they achieved on their own allocation was 
what was important, not how the district produced as a whole. 
 
 
 In terms of the concepts discussed in the introduction to this paper, target-based 
teamworking can be seen as being reliant on outcome interdependence.  More than this, it is 
reliant on the goal rather than the reward aspect of outcome interdependence.  Reward is still 
based primarily on individual rather than team performance; while it is employees’ 
identification with their team’s goal or target output, rather than their identification with their 
fellow team members, that provides their identification with the team. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We can now see what form teamworking takes in the Inland Revenue.  The starting point is 
the shift from individual to group allocations of work. In conjunction with the move to a 
more facilitative style of management, the shift allows some degree of autonomy at the level 
of the group or team.  The degree of autonomy is quite limited, however, extending only to 
cover the issue of how work within the group is allocated.  Despite the intentions of senior 
management, there is also very little in the way of increased flexibility.  With teams' blurred 
and shifting boundaries meaning that there exists little in the way of group identification and 
development, it is, more than anything, the work target that defines the team.  We might go as 
far as to say that it is difficult, if not impossible, to consider the team and the target separately 
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from each other.  What we have in the Inland Revenue is, in short, a 'target-based' form of 
teamworking. 
Teamworking in the Inland Revenue is thus of a very parsimonious character: what 
might be considered quite a ‘weak’ form of teamworking appears capable of having a 
significant impact.  We should remember, however, that prior to the introduction of 
teamworking, work was organized on a highly individualized basis.  To return to a point 
made in our introduction, we need to take account of the direction of change as well as its 
destination.  That said, we do have a situation in which, rather than the panoply of support 
systems often associated with teamworking, the key to its operation rests in a relatively 
simple reorganization of production and work.  Space does not permit a full consideration of 
these issues here, but we have investigated them at length in another paper (Currie & Procter, 
2003).  In the present paper we have used the fate of the Team Development Pack (TDP) to 
illustrate the point that the explicitly cultural attempts to promote teamworking were largely 
ineffective.  The case as a whole is in line with the down-playing of the normative elements 
of teamworking which is suggested in the work of, for example, Cohen and Ledford (1994).    
This is not to suggest that this is the way in which teamworking will or should operate 
in all circumstances.  Our findings provide more support to those such as Dunphy & Bryant 
(1996), who argue that it is necessary to identify and understand the differences between a 
variety of forms of teamworking.  In this spirit we can identify certain contingent factors that 
seem to be important in our case.  Prominent amongst these is what we might describe as the 
production technology in the Inland Revenue.  Two aspects of this deserve particular 
attention.  First, work is easily expressed in terms of quantitative targets, and these targets are 
easily translatable between the different levels of individual, team and office.  An office 
target can easily be divided into a set of team targets and, in turn, into a set of individual 
targets.  Looked at from the other direction, individual targets can easily be added together to 
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produce a team target and, in turn, an office target.  It may be that this form of teamworking 
is applicable in other, similar settings: the call centre is one that immediately suggests itself. 
The second aspect of the Inland Revenue’s production technology is that, in parallel 
to the first, the physical organization of production is relatively easy to change.  Compared to 
the time and effort involved in, say, reorganizing the factory floor for cellular manufacturing, 
the shifting of desks around an open-plan office is quite a straightforward matter.  By the 
same token, it must be noted that the ease with which teams can be formed and re-formed 
means that there may be little incentive to make any particular configuration effective. 
Before returning to the concerns raised in our introduction, there is one issue that we 
must address: can the introduction of teamworking in the Inland Revenue be considered 
successful?  Our case provides an example of the idea that teamworking now has as its 
concern not job design but an organization’s more strategic objectives.  It could even be 
argued that in removing from individuals some degree of ‘ownership’ of their work, jobs 
were less well-designed than they had been.  In trying to assess the more strategic objectives, 
the use of quantitative evidence lies somewhat outside the scope of this research project.  It 
would, in any case, be very difficult to provide.  We have no non-teamworking 'control 
group’ either inside or outside the organization; while a before-and-after comparison of work 
volumes would have been difficult to conduct against the background of the simultaneous 
introduction of self-assessment (SA). 
Following Shea & Guzzo (1987a: 329) we can look at the effectiveness of 
teamworking in terms of its 'situation specific' goals.  The most tangible of these was that 
teamworking would contribute to the successful transition to SA.  Although there was not 
general agreement on the precise manner in which it had done so, the impression gained from 
employees at all levels was that the transition to SA was certainly eased by teamworking and, 
if anything, might not have been achieved without it. 
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But what about the concepts of interdependence which we highlighted in the 
introduction to this paper?  The case presented here certainly demonstrates their usefulness in 
analysing teamworking.  Most basically of all, the move from individual to group allocations 
in the Inland Revenue can be seen as a shift from pooled to reciprocal interdependence.  
Although teamworking in its reciprocal form tends to direct our attention to the task aspects 
of interdependence, the case presented here suggests that more attention than hitherto might 
be given to its outcome aspects and, in particular, to goals rather than rewards.   Our findings 
are more in line with those of Shea & Guzzo (1987a, 1987b), whose emphasis is on outcome 
interdependence, than with those of Wageman (1995), who emphasises interdependence in 
tasks.  Our case also illustrates Shea & Guzzo's point about how, especially in certain 
technological conditions, management might take advantage of the malleability of task 
interdependence by leaving this aspect to team members and concentrating their own efforts 
on outcome interdependence. 
Our findings also allow us to cast light on the processes underlying some of the 
associations identified in the literature.  The first of these concerns the relationship between 
task interdependence and outcome interdependence.  We are presented in the Inland Revenue 
with a complex relationship between the reciprocal interdependence in tasks and the outcome 
interdependence as represented by the team target.   At one level, employees' identification 
with their team target provides the means of offsetting the costs inherent in the shift to 
reciprocal interdependence.  Task and outcome interdependence thus tend to work in opposite 
directions to each other.  At the same time, it is unlikely that the same degree of identification 
with the team target would have been achieved without the greater reciprocal 
interdependence.   Had group allocations been worked simply as the aggregation of 
individual allocations, it is difficult to envisage a move to the situation in which individuals 
regarded their own performance much more in terms of its contribution to their team’s 
 33 
performance.  In this respect, the two forms of interdependence work in conjunction with 
each other.  In itself, this might help us to understand Wageman's (1995) finding concerning 
the influence of task interdependence on outcome interdependence.  What it means more 
broadly is that we have two conflicting tendencies.  A full account of the relationship 
between task and outcome interdependence would thus need to take into account the 
possibility of their simultaneously working both with and against each other. 
 These points also have implications for our understanding of the relationship between 
interdependence and autonomy.  Liden et al.'s (1997) study identified task interdependence as 
a moderator of the relationship between group autonomy and performance, and we can now say 
something about the dynamics of this.  The introduction of autonomy over the allocation of 
work in the Inland Revenue allowed teams to exercise some discretion over the degree of task 
interdependence.  The greater the degree of autonomy, the more might reciprocal 
interdependence be expected to extend.  As we have suggested, the greater the degree of 
reciprocity, the greater the contribution to the identification with the team target and, with that, 
the greater the contribution to performance.  The greater the degree of autonomy, in other words, 
the more effective teamworking might be.  Against this, however, have to be set the greater costs 
of co-ordination that reciprocal interdependence involves.  Attempts to achieve greater levels of 
interdependence through the extension of group autonomy might therefore be counter-
productive: the benefits from the identification with the team target might never outweigh the 
increase in the costs of co-ordination.  We cannot say how this relationship between reciprocal 
and outcome interdependence will in all cases work itself out.  What we can say is that rather 
than in terms of autonomy, it is in terms of the relationship between autonomy and 
interdependence that teamworking might best be investigated and understood. 
Making use of these arguments allows us to go some way towards resolving the two 
puzzles we identified at the beginning of this paper.  We have shown how applying ideas of 
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interdependence allows us to resolve the empirical puzzle: teamworking in the Inland 
Revenue is effective through the interaction of autonomy and interdependence rather than 
through autonomy alone.   This also suggests an answer to our conceptual puzzle.  A greater 
emphasis on interdependence gives us a conception of teamworking that encompasses both 
its autonomy-based forms and those where autonomy is largely absent.  It is here that we 
might look for an answer to the ‘issue of autonomy’. 
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